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Faculty Observables and Self-Reported Responsiveness to 
Academic Dishonesty 
Robert T. Burrus, Jr., Ph.D. 
Adam T. Jones, Ph.D. 
William H. Sackley, Ph.D. 
Michael Walker, Ph.D. 
University of North Carolina, Wilmington 
ABSTRACT 
Prior to 2009, a mid-sized public institution in the southeast had a faculty-driven honor policy 
characterized by little education about the policy and no tracking of repeat offenders. An 
updated code, implemented in August of 2009, required that students sign an honor pledge, 
created a formal student honor board, and developed a process to track and hold accountable, 
repeat offenders. Self-reported data on faculty vigilance to detect and punish cheating is 
collected both prior to and after a change in the honor code at a mid-sized public institution in 
the southeast. We find that, at the time of the first survey, full professors and faculty with a 
longer duration of employment were more likely to claim vigilance in cheating detection and 
harshness in punishing cheaters than newer, untenured faculty. The relationship between these 
factors and detection and harshness diminished when the honor code was enhanced. 
Keywords: academic honesty, faculty, administration, honor code 
he cheating epidemic in universities across the world is well documented, with recent research 
taking the problem as given and examining factors that contribute to cheating or whether the 
problem is getting worse. In the effort to develop policies to prevent student cheating, many 
studies have focused on factors correlated with academic dishonesty. These factors broadly include 
individual student characteristics (age, gender, grade-point average, and membership in a fraternity or 
sorority), perceptions about the cheating of peers, whether professors are clear in defining cheating, 
and perceptions about the likelihood of being caught for cheating and the severity of penalties if caught. 
The research presented in this article contributes to the literature by focusing on changes in faculty 
vigilance and attitudes, rather than focusing on students, following the imposition of an honor code. 
While there is a growing consensus that cheating is a problem on academic campuses, the more difficult 
as well as  more interesting topics may be causes and prevention methods. In general, students and 
faculty have substantially similar views of what is considered cheating. Roig and Ballew (1994) find that 
T 
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student perceptions of what faculty consider cheating match faculty views relatively closely, while 
faculty tend to overestimate students’ tolerance of academic dishonesty. However, it should be noted 
that students’ perceptions of professors’ tolerance correlates with their own tolerance. This could be 
students projecting their views onto faculty, or students may be taking cues from faculty members. To 
the extent that it is the latter, further research on faculty attitudes is warranted. The research presented 
below examines the relationship between self-reported faculty vigilance in detecting and punishing 
cheating and observable faculty characteristics. 
Cheating Definitions and Demographics 
Graham et al. (1994) compared survey data of students from a private Catholic college and a community 
college to that of faculty at the Catholic college and found agreement between students and faculty 
about the most egregious infractions. However, a much smaller percentage of students believed 
behaviors that were helping others, such as providing information about a test or allowing someone to 
copy homework, constituted cheating. There was also disagreement about using an old test to study 
without the teacher's knowledge or submitting a paper for more than one class. Exploring the more 
ambiguous behaviors, Higbee and Thomas (2002) surveyed students and faculty and found that student 
and faculty views are similar but there is considerable disagreement within each group. Burrus, 
McGoldrick, and Schuhmann (2007) showed that providing a definition of cheating increases the 
number of incidents self-reported by students. Their result implies that the set of behaviors considered 
cheating is not universal.i Even if the dichotomous definitions of cheating were the same, Roth and 
McCabe (1995) showed that agreement on the severity of infractions, as judged by penalties suggested, 
is lacking.   
In addition to the focus on definitions of cheating, there is a healthy literature on student- specific 
characteristics and situational factors that contribute to cheating. One such factor is students’ 
perception or experience with others cheating.ii O’Rourke et al. (2010) suggested that when viewed as a 
social behavior, the knowledge, suspicion, or direct observation of peers cheating may have an 
important effect on students’ behavior. In fact, they found that when presented with a vignette 
including peer cheating, students’ responses regarding their own anticipated behavior is only moderated 
by latent attitudes. This finding emphasizes the importance of a culture of honesty and creating a 
negative-feedback loop instead of defaulting to the positive-feedback loop prevalent on academic 
campuses. By default, responsibility for clearly communicating a definition of acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior falls to the individual faculty member. Parameswaran (2007) went as far as to 
state that faculty members have a responsibility to prevent cheating and faculty who “allow” dishonesty 
are morally responsible for it. 
Prevention 
Having established that academic dishonesty is a problem, the literature also investigates techniques for 
prevention. Much of the literature views academic dishonesty as analogous to crime  and is based on 
Becker’s (1968) seminal work modeling the supply of crime as a function of probability of conviction and 
the likely punishment once convicted, sometimes also referred to as certainty and severity of 
punishment respectively. Doob and Webster (2003) provided a review of the crime literature and found 
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that the response to severity of punishment is almost non-existent; yet most researchers are hesitant to 
accept the finding. Doob and Webster’s findings are consistent with other reviews such as Paternoster’s 
(1987). This suggestion is supported by Barnard-Brak, Schmidt, and Wei (2013) who used experimental 
style survey data varying the penalty for infraction and found that being reported to an honor board 
may not have any deterrent effect beyond that of a verbal reprimand and grade penalty. While there is 
some work suggesting severity (or its perception) of penalties deters cheating, such as Burrus et al. 
(2013), LaSalle (2009), Mixon (1996), etc., there are also studies that found severity of penalties to be 
positively related to cheating and suggest there are potential endogeneity problems in such variables 
(McCabe & Trevino, 1993). In addition, many studies found the probability of punishment is much more 
important than severity, such as McCabe and Trevino (1993) or Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) to  cite  only 
two.   
While the literature on strategies to prevent cheating is fairly significant, the literature regarding tactics 
remains relatively thin. One notable exception is Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (2009) who found both 
cheaters and non-cheaters believe question scrambling to be an effective cheating-reduction tactic. In 
addition, cheaters believe the use of study sheets and passing out old exams to be a more effective 
deterrent than non-cheaters believe. This result is consistent with the literature that suggests the 
perception that others are cheating or have some advantage contributes to the likelihood of cheating; 
by leveling the playing field and being clear about the expectations, faculty make cheating less tempting. 
The most effective countermeasure may be to build up and tap into student morals and integrity. Ogilvie 
and Stewart (2010) and Cochran et al. (1999) suggested that student attitudes – especially shame – are 
the most important deterrents. Their findings, combined with the ineffectiveness of administrative 
punishments, suggest that the role of faculty and administrators may be to promote a culture of 
integrity, dialogue with the students, and encourage students to take an active role in policing their 
peers. 
If, as is often suggested by the cheating and crime literature, it is certainty of punishment that deters 
cheating and crime, then the policy prescription is to increase vigilance and follow up on allegations of 
cheating. Thus, one component of increasing the certainty of punishment is to encourage and facilitate 
peer reporting. Unfortunately, many students are hesitant to report their peers. Nuss (1984) suggested 
that only 3% of students would report their peers for any infraction and slightly more than a quarter of 
students would report peers for serious infractions unless required to report by the university. In the 
case of required reporting, those who would report “any infraction” increases to 15%, and 28% would 
report if they believed the infraction to be “serious.” Sierles, Kushner, and Krause (1988) reported that 
only 13% of cheaters will anonymously self-report cheating on unproctored behavioral-science exams, 
and their findings are considerably higher than Burton and Near (1995), who put the percentage in the 
three to four percent range!  
Rennie and Crosby (2002) put the percentage of students willing to report peers at 13%; but they also 
suggested some reasons why peers would or would not report. Reasons not to report their peers 
included camaraderie, fear of retaliation, cheating as the accepted norm, and perception that policing 
cheating is someone else’s responsibility. Students also indicated that a lack of guidelines, high 
evidentiary requirements, uncertainty about what is considered cheating, and a poor administrative 
record on follow-through discourage reporting. Reasons for reporting include avoiding negative 
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consequences for themselves or others, maintaining standards and integrity, getting violators the help 
they need, and satisfying the desire for vengeance. Jenkel and Haen (2012) suggested that one way to 
encourage reporting is to make sure students understand how cheating by their peers affects their own 
grade. They also suggested a reporting system must maintain anonymity in order to reduce social costs 
and fear of reprisal. 
Honor Codes 
The varied findings across the research regarding certainty and severity of punishment, peer reporting, 
student attitudes, etc., suggest that reducing cheating is more about cultural change than simply a 
tweak to administrative policies. McCabe and Trevino (1993) suggested universities that employ 
“traditional” honor codes typically have decreased self-reports of cheating. These traditional codes are 
characterized by unproctored exams, an honor pledge, the encouragement or requirement of student 
reporting of cheating, and student-run honor boards. These campuses generally have higher levels of 
peer reporting of cheating (McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 2001). Yet Vandehey, Diekhoff, and LaBeff 
(2007) reported no change in students’ self-reporting of cheating following the imposition of an honor 
code, and they found non-cheaters are much more supportive of the honor code than cheaters. Thus, a 
change in policy alone may not have an effect. Furthermore, relying solely on students to police cheating 
may conflict with other university goals. Gallant (2007) pointed out that relationships, community, and 
group learning may conflict with integrity and peer reporting. In promoting a culture of honesty, there is 
a role for students, faculty, and administrators, as suggested in Whitley and Keith-Spiegel (2001), in 
emphasizing its importance as well as maintaining that focus over time in order to change and/or 
maintain the culture. 
Most universities (especially large ones) do not use traditional honor codes. This leaves the faculty (and 
administrators) on the front-lines against academic dishonesty at universities without traditional honor 
codes. Unfortunately, as Staats et al. (2009) suggested, even faculty avoid cheating confrontations, often 
due to lack of evidence. Coren (2011) noted that faculty avoidance could be rationalized behavior to 
avoid uncomfortable, confrontational situations, and Roig and Ballew (1994) suggested that students 
become more tolerant of academic dishonesty when faculty members avoid confrontations.   
This increase in tolerance brings the role of honor codes and policies full-circle. Traditional honor codes 
rely on pledges and peer policing, which may be lax, and honor policies rely on policies set forth by the 
university to which much of the cheating may be unobservable. Many universities have adopted 
modified honor codes that retain both faculty and student involvement. These efforts may help to create 
a culture of honesty among the students, as suggested by McCabe and Trevino (1997), and an 
environment in which faculty persons believe that they are united against cheating. 
While there is a rich and growing literature examining factors that impact student cheating, the analysis 
of professorial attitudes toward cheating and activities to combat cheating is relatively thin. If the 
weakness of a traditional honor code is that it relies on students and culture, the weakness of honor 
policies is that they rely on faculty members who very well may have other priorities, such as research. 
However, many large institutions use a modified honor-code allocating responsibility to both faculty and 
students. This suggests the role of the faculty is to motivate students to learn and master material, as 
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well as continue to emphasize the importance of academic honesty and integrity. This paper seeks to 
determine the factors that relate to increased faculty policing of cheating at a regional, public university 
in the Southeast.    
DATA 
In the Fall of 2008, the mid-sized public institution in the southeast conducted an on-line survey of both 
students and faculty. These initial, anonymous surveys were administered to 5,000 students and all 
faculty persons during February of 2009. Following a change from an honor policy to a modified honor 
code, a similar survey was also conducted in 2011.    
The new, modified code, which took effect in August of 2009, is somewhere between the old policy and 
a traditional honor code. The modified code gave faculty the ability to sentence students on their first 
cheating offence, with an accompanying letter of responsibility placed in the student’s academic file in 
the Dean of Student’s Office. If the student cheated thereafter, the case automatically went before an 
honor board consisting of four students and two faculty members. The recommended punishment for a 
repeat offender is a one-semester suspension. In addition to the student-led honor board, students now 
sign an honor pledge when they arrive on campus and continue to be encouraged to report witnessed 
infractions. Both students and faculty are supposed to be educated about the honor code each year, and 
the honor code statement appears on nearly every syllabus.   
Both faculty surveys had, approximately, a one-third response rate. Faculty members were asked to 
indicate which behaviors they considered cheating from a list of eighteen (see Table 1). In the two years 
after the new code was adopted, there was an increase in the proportion of faculty who believed that 
the listed behaviors constituted cheating in fourteen of the eighteen cases. However, asking for help 
from a classmate on the assigned homework, paper, or project was the only behavior that drew a 
statistically significant increase in the proportion of faculty listing the behavior as cheating. (Notably, 
asking a classmate a question about a take-home exam was significant at the 11% level.) A lower 
proportion of faculty reported considering the following as cheating behaviors: adding to one’s 
bibliography unread sources, poor citations, visiting a professor to influence grades, and using a cheat 
sheet. The only statistically significant decrease, however, was in the case of using unread sources in a 
bibliography. This behavior was not specifically outlawed in the new code. 
Faculty members were also asked about their university demographics and about the certainty and 
severity of punishment in their classes. Variable descriptions of these data are provided in Table 2 with 
descriptive statistics provided in Table 3. Using the data acquired from Table 1, the variable Considered 
Cheating is the average number of behaviors that a faculty person considered to be cheating (from the 
list of eighteen). We note some long tails to the distribution as some faculty members believed that only 
a single action was cheating, while others believed that almost all the listed actions constituted 
cheating. We also note that there was no statistical change in the average between the two surveys 
(pre-code average was 9.05, while post-code average was 9.26 behaviors). 
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Table 1 
















Asking for help from a classmate on the assigned 
homework, paper, or project 
.068 .252 .047 .089 .086* 
Using a false excuse to get another exam date or to be 
allowed to turn an assignment in past the due date 
.808 .394 .803 .813 .788 
Writing formulas or other information on the back of an 
exam as soon as it is received 
.084 .278 .070 .098 .303 
Glancing at another student's test during the testing 
period 
.944 .231 .944 .944 .991 
Allowing another student to look on a test during the 
testing period 
.970 .172 .967 .972 .772 
Comparing homework answers with a classmate's prior 
to class 
.111 .313 .099 .121 .450 
Asking a classmate a question about a take-home exam .578 .494 .540 .617 .108 
Using a test or quiz from a previous semester to study .265 .442 .244 .285 .338 
Having someone check over a paper before turning it in .040 .196 .033 .047 .464 
Asking about the content of an exam from someone who 
has taken it 
.728 .449 .695 .748 .224 
Giving information about the content of an exam to 
someone who has not yet taken it 
.827 .379 .812 .841 .430 
Adding to one's bibliography citations that have not been 
read so it appears more research has been conducted 
than actually has 
.728 .445 .770 .687 .054* 
Failing to properly cite another author's work .867 .341 .873 .860 .683 
Visiting a professor to influence a grade .218 .413 .239 .196 .280 
Using a cheat sheet during an exam .939 .239 .948 .930 .425 
Having information programmed into a calculator during 
an exam 
.895 .307 .878 .911 .263 
Studying with another student for an exam .002 .048 0 .005 .318 
Using only resources that confirm your point of view 
when preparing a paper 
.089 .285 .085 .093 .745 
N 427  213 214  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  









Discrete Number of items in Table 1 considered cheating 
Vigilance Discrete Level of vigilance in detecting cheating [potential answers were very vigilant (4), 
moderately vigilant (3), slightly vigilant (2), and not at all vigilant (1)] 
Strict 
Penalties 
Discrete Self-reported strictness of penalties [potential answers were severe (4), moderate 
(3), mild (2), and none (1)] 
Confront Discrete Level of vigilance in confronting suspected cheaters [potential answers were very 
vigilant (4), moderately vigilant (3), slightly vigilant (2), and not at all vigilant (1)] 
Prevention 
Index  
Discrete Considered Cheating x Vigilance x Strict Penalties x Confront 
Code on 
Syllabus 
Binary Inclusion of a mention of honor code on syllabus 
Topics Discrete The number of examples or other honor-code topics on syllabus 
Discuss Binary Discusses honor code on first day of class 
Female Binary Indicates respondent is female 
Long tenure Binary At school longer than 6 years 
Full 
professor 
Binary Indicates respondent is a full professor 
Associate 
professor 
Binary Indicates respondent is an associate professor 
Full time 
lecturer 
Binary Indicates respondent is non-tenure track 
Business Binary Indicates faculty member is in Business school 
Nursing Binary Indicates faculty member is in Nursing School 
Other 
school 
Binary Indicates faculty member is in Education or Arts and Sciences 
 
  




 Full Sample Pre-Code Post-Code Means/Prop. 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean Mean P-Value 
Considered 
cheating 
9.15 2.29 1 16 9.05 9.26 .344 
Vigilance 3.07 .69 1 4 3.04 3.09 .488 
Strict penalties 2.81 .89 1 4 2.78 2.85 .442 
Confront 3.28 .77 1 4 3.24 3.31 .323 
Prevention index 63.62 40.06 1.56 185 62.90 64.33 .712 
Code on syllabus .90 .29 0 1 .88 .93 .135 
Topics 3.14 1.95 0 8 2.9 3.37 .013** 
Discuss .81 .39 0 1 .78 .84 .167 
Female .48 .50 0 1 .42 .53 .018** 
Long tenure .52 .50 0 1 .51 .54 .469 
Full professor .25 .43 0 1 .26 .24 .634 
Associate professor .28 .45 0 1 .24 .32 .071* 
Full-time lecturer .15 .35 0 1 .13 .16 .281 
Business .13 .34 0 1 .14 .12 .459 
N 427    213 214  
Note. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Faculty members were also asked to describe the penalties they assigned for academic dishonesty—
potential answers were severe (coded as 4), moderate (3), mild (2), and none (1)— and how vigilant they 
are about detecting and confronting cheating—potential answers were very vigilant (coded as 4), 
moderately vigilant (3), slightly vigilant (2), and not at all vigilant (1). On average across both surveys, 
faculty consider themselves to be moderately vigilant in detecting cheating; the variable vigilant has a 
mean of 3.07. In addition, faculty self-report assigning moderately strict penalties and are moderately 
likely to confront observed cheaters. Though each of these variables increased after the new code was 
implemented, these increases were not statistically significant.    
To ascertain a faculty member’s overall efforts to prevent cheating, a prevention index was created by 
multiplying the considered cheating, vigilant, strict penalties, and confront variables.iii To construct the 
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index, considered cheating was rescaled, such that believing all 18 behaviors constituted cheating is 
scaled as a four; the rescaling helps to align the magnitude of this variable with others used to compute 
the index. Given variable coding, the prevention index can range from 0 to 256, depending on the how 
broad a faculty member’s definition of cheating is, the strictness of his or her penalties, and how vigilant 
he or she is about detecting and confronting cheating. Across both surveys, the average prevention 
measure was 63.62, with a slight, but not statistically significant, increase in prevention after the 
adoption of the new code.   
Faculty persons were queried about reminders they offer to students about the honor code in their 
courses. While the majority of professors provide an honor code statement on their syllabus, code on 
syllabus, and discuss the honor code on the first day of class, discuss, it is interesting to see the 
statistical increase in the attention given to specificity of honor code violations and other issues. In 
particular, faculty were asked about including each of eight topics on their syllabi: providing a definition 
of cheating, providing a definition of plagiarism, the importance of academic honesty, penalties for 
cheating, how to do proper citations, a web link to the honor code, indications about whether students 
can work together, and other instructions about the honor code. The average number of these topics 
included on a syllabus was a little over three (3.14), but that number significantly grew from the first to 
the second survey (2.9 topics to 3.37).   
Other data acquired from the surveys were institutional demographic characteristics of the faculty 
respondents. Approximately half the respondents to both surveys had a long tenure of six or more years 
with the institution. In addition, roughly 25% of respondents were full professors, 25% 
associate_professors, 15% full-time lecturers, with the remainder of the respondents being assistant 
professors. Between the two surveys, slightly less than half of the respondents were female (48%), with 
slightly more than half of respondents on the second survey (53%) being female. Thirteen percent of 
faculty respondents were in the business school.   
MODEL 
Because pre- and post-code survey results are available, it is possible to examine the relationships 
between observable characteristics and self-reported vigilance against cheating, as well as the change in 
those relationships following the implementation of a modified honor code. Because the surveys are 
anonymous, traditional panel techniques cannot be used. In addition, because respondents may be 
represented in both the pre- and post-code surveys, the use of a post-code binary variable interacted 
with other explanatory variables is inappropriate.   
To avoid concerns about respondents being included in both pre- and post-code surveys, one could 
estimate a model for each survey and then compare the results. We use a similar approach. The two 
models can be simultaneously estimated by interacting each variable with a binary variable indicating 
whether the observation is from the pre-code survey, pre, or the post-code survey, post, and including 
binary variables for pre-code and post-code in place of the traditional constant. This method of 
interactions has the effect of estimating two separate regressions at the same time; it is equivalent to 
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stacking the observations from each survey. The benefit of this method is that post-estimation 
comparison of the pre- and post-code coefficients is straightforward using an F test.iv   
The following equation was estimated using ordinary-least squares for the model with prevention_index 
as the dependent variable and estimated using a Poisson regression with vigilance in detecting cheaters, 
vigilance, strictness of penalties, strict penalties, and vigilance in confronting suspected cheaters, 
confront, as the dependent variable. 
Prevention_indexi = prei x (β1 + β2code_on_syllabusi + β3topicsi + β4discussi + ΓΧ) + prei x (β13 + 
β14code_on_syllabusi + β15topicsi + β16discussi + ΓΧ)+ εi 
Demographic variables are represented by Γ and Χ, vectors of betas and demographic variables 
respectively. The regression results displayed in Table 4 list the pre- and post-code coefficients together 
for ease of discussion and comparison. In the model, topics is a quantitative variable, and the remainder 
of the explanatory variables are binary. All four dependent variables are quantitative to varying degrees 
and are scaled such that a higher value is consistent with a tougher stance on cheating. 
The literature on observable characteristics of faculty who are soft or tough on cheating is relatively 
thin; thus, we have few priors about the coefficients of the variables in our analysis. We anticipate 
positive coefficients for code on syllabus, topics, and discuss as all of these reveal faculty attitudes 
toward cheating; those more concerned about cheating are likely to give it more weight on the syllabus 
and on the first (and possibly subsequent) day of class. We also anticipate full professor and long tenure 
are positively related to our measures of vigilance as older, more established professors presumably 
take more ownership in the institution and are beyond the more intense research pressures of younger 
faculty.v However, two-tailed tests are used to assess the significance of each coefficient. We have no 
priors for associate professor or female.   
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. The first column in the table models the prevention index, 
constructed as the product of the number of items a faculty member considers to be cheating times 
numeric representations of their self-reported vigilance to detect cheating, strictness of penalties, and 
likelihood of confronting cheaters. Columns (2) through (4) model individual components of the index. 
The coefficients are ordered such that the estimated values for the pre-code and post-code regressions 
are adjacent to each other. Of note is a pattern of reduced significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients, lending support to the assertion that the implementation and increased emphasis of the 
honor code has made the faculty more uniform in their efforts toward preventing cheating. 
While the faculty in general have become more engaged and uniform in their efforts to prevent 
cheating, some remain obstinate. For example, prior to the implementation of the new honor code, 
code_on_syllabus was not a significant signal of a faculty member’s unobservable efforts to prevent 
cheating as measured by the prevention index in column (1). However, the inclusion of the honor code 
on the syllabus following the revision of the code is a strong signal of faculty members’ prevention 
efforts and vigilance in confronting suspected cheaters. The large magnitude of the coefficient is less  
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code_on_syllabus_pre -10.24+++ -0.0871*++ 0.00383 -0.0760++ 
 (-1.16) (-1.67) (0.02) (-1.33) 
code_on_syllabus_post 21.57***+++ 0.136++ 0.144 0.133**++ 
 (2.87) (1.55) (1.10) (2.02) 
topics_pre 6.671***+ 0.0298*** 0.0703***++ 0.0333*** 
 (4.38) (3.95) (4.03) (4.08) 
topics_post 2.872*+ 0.0134* 0.0120++ 0.0174**2 
 (1.90) (1.74) (0.73) (2.41) 
discuss_pre 16.47**+ 0.135***++ 0.259** 0.0449 
 (2.52) (2.96) (2.14) (0.92) 
discuss_post -0.309+ -0.00196++ 0.0251 0.00481 
 (-0.04) (-0.04) (0.25) (0.10) 
female_pre 7.739 0.0439 0.101 0.0518 
 (1.39) (1.41) (1.41) (1.54) 
female_post 5.166 0.0131 0.0470 0.0245 
 (0.95) (0.41) (0.66) (0.77) 
long_tenure_pre 16.78*** -0.0193 0.217** 0.0786** 
 (2.60) (-0.52) (2.52) (1.97) 
long_tenure_post 10.71 0.0515 0.0559 0.0567 
 (1.40) (1.47) (0.64) (1.45) 
full_professor_pre -1.678 0.0954**++ 0.0703 0.0467 
 (-0.20) (2.07) (0.68) (0.98) 
full_professor_post -11.57 -0.0483++ -0.0347 -0.00794 
 (-1.17) (-0.86) (-0.30) (-0.15) 
associate_professor_pre -23.44*** -0.0218 -0.126 -0.0249 
 (-3.26) (-0.52) (-1.28) (-0.53) 
associate_professor_post -9.069 -0.00680 -0.116 -0.0456 
 (-1.18) (-0.19) (-1.18) (-1.04) 
full_time_lec_pre 1.747 0.0366 0.0484 -0.00250 
 (0.18) (0.76) (0.45) (-0.04) 
full_time_lec_post 4.816 0.0357 -0.0213 0.0563 
 (0.53) (0.77) (-0.21) (1.29) 
business_pre -6.009 -0.0408 -0.0429 -0.0856+ 
 (-0.85) (-0.91) (-0.37) (-1.55) 
business_post 7.390 0.0545 0.0432 0.0305+ 
 (0.90) (1.22) (0.48) (0.88) 
pre_code 34.57*** 0.966*** -0.00126+ 1.051*** 
 (3.66) (16.45) (-0.01) (15.84) 
post_code 30.37*** 0.923*** 0.403***+ 0.969*** 
 (3.27) (9.68) (2.58) (13.17) 
N 427 427 427 427 
R2 0.761    
Pre  ≠ post mode P-value .0312 .0561 .0732 .1758 
Note. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; difference in pre and post indicated by 
+
 p < .1, 
++ p <. 05, +++ p < .01 
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reflective of faculty members who put the code on their syllabus and more indicative of the lax attitude 
of those who do not. On average, faculty members who include the code, and/or a link to it, on their 
syllabus have a higher prevention index, consider more behaviors to be cheating, consider themselves to 
be more vigilant in detecting cheating, assess their own penalties as strict, and believe themselves to be 
more likely to confront cheaters.vi This difference is evidenced by the significantly larger coefficient 
estimates for the post- versus pre-code values in regressions (1), (2), and (4), all significantly different at 
the 5% level as evidenced by the two “plus” symbols next to the coefficient estimates. 
Other indicators of faculty efforts such as topics are still an indicator but not as strong. The coefficient 
on topics remains a statistically significant indicator of faculty efforts in three of the four regressions but 
is a weaker signal following the implementation of the code. The pre- and post-code coefficients for 
topics are significantly different at the 10% level for (1), the 5% level in (3), and the 15% level for (2) and 
(4). The changes in these coefficients illustrate a substantial reduction in the difference between faculty 
in the visible front presented to students regarding academic dishonesty. Furthermore, discuss used to 
be a significant signal but no longer is; eighty-four percent (84%) of faculty discuss academic honesty at 
the start of their courses. While this is not significantly more than before the survey, many of the faculty 
on the softer end of the enforcement spectrum now give academic honesty lip service in the classroom, 
thus reducing the value of the signal and increasing students’ uncertainty about the likelihood of 
successfully cheating.  
Females were slightly tougher than males, although not significantly so, but that gap has closed as well. 
Long-tenure has also lost its significance as a signal, again showing that gap between faculty members is 
closing. While associate professor previously indicated a weaker attitude toward detecting and 
penalizing cheating, associate professors are no longer distinguishable from assistant or full professors. 
Finally, there was also a culture shift in the business school. While business was not significantly weaker 
than other schools in a statistically significant sense, the estimated pre-code coefficients on business 
were negative in all four regressions, a finding consistent with the literature, including Meade (1992), 
McCabe and Trevino (1995), and Park (2003). However, the estimated post-code coefficients are 
positive, although still insignificant compared to other academic units at the university. For the 
regression examining vigilance in confronting cheaters, business is significantly more positive than the 
pre-code counterpart; the attitude toward preventing cheating within the business school has improved 
by more than attitudes in other academic units following the implementation of the modified honor 
code.  
CONCLUSION 
For all the efforts of administrators, reducing academic cheating is dependent on the faculty and 
students, and the students take their cues from the faculty. Faculty members are the front line in the 
fight against cheating, set the tone in the classroom, and give students their cues as to how tolerant 
they should be of fellow students’ dishonesty. The research presented in this paper suggests that factors 
identifying softer faculty, such as the lack of an honor-code reference on their syllabus, not discussing 
academic honesty at the start of the course, and having the rank of associate professor, can be 
diminished in their signaling value by implementing a modified honor code to present a more unified 
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faculty to students. There are several potential explanations for why some faculty members may be 
weaker on academic honesty than others, including ignorance of the university’s policies, a lack of 
confidence in administrative support, and the desire to avoid uncomfortable confrontations with 
students among others. While we do not specifically identify the factors at play, our research does 
indicate that it is possible to overcome these qualms through stronger honor codes or policies and 
administrative support. The faculty is the front line in the fight against cheating, but administrative 
support is a necessary component in holding the line. 
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i
 This raises the question of whether many institution’s policies would meet the Justice Sutherlands 
vagueness doctrine suggesting vague laws are void (Connally v. General Construction Co., 1926). 
ii See Burrus, Jones, Sackley and Walker (2013), McCabe and Trevino (1993), and Mixon (1996)  among 
others. 
iii The Chronbach’s alpha statistic of reliability for the index is 0.641, slightly below the commonly 
accepted 0.70 rule of thumb.  However, the small number of items in the index, four, deflates the value 
such that 0.641 is assumed to indicate a reliable index. 
iv Alternatively the regressions could be estimated separately and a Chow test used to compare 
coefficients.  However, separate regressions do not allow for simple testing of individual coefficients to 
see if the specific coefficients have changed.   
v Our grandfathers were pessimistic about younger generations, so we assume this comes with age! 
vi These comparisons are made looking only at sample means and are not tested for significance of 
differences. 
